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Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change
in the general law.'
We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to improve the
public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.2
Although seemingly contradictory, these two quotations from Justice
Oliver Wendall Holmes in the classic taking case of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon3 demonstrate the dynamic tension that exists between the need for
government regulation of the use of land to protect the rights of the general
public and the need to protect the rights of individual property owners from
government regulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Bert J. Harris Jr. Private Property Rights Protection Act ("Act")4
was enacted by the Florida Legislature during its 1995 legislative session
and signed into law by the governor. The Act reflects a strong national
trend in many states, as well as in Congress, towards a search for statutory
and constitutional definitions to create a bright line between valid govern-
ment regulations and takings that neither Justice Holmes nor any court has
yet been able to definitively articulate.
The Act creates a new statutory cause of action and remedy that allows
for private property owners to be compensated by a governmental agency
that inordinately burdens, restricts, or limits an existing or vested use of real
property. If the court determines that such an inordinate burden has
occurred, the remedy is compensation for the fair market value of the
property due to the loss created by the government action. The jury
determines the fair market value of the property. The express intent of the
1. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
2. Id. at 416.
3. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
4. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)). House Bill 863
was passed by a vote of 111 to 0 in the House and 38 to 1 in the Senate. This enactment
also contains the "Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act," which is
apparently an attempt to avoid the very litigation which the authors believe the Private
Property Rights Act will foster. See Ch. 95-181, §2, 1995 Fla. Laws 1651, 1657 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 70.51 (1995)).
5. See generally John Martinez, Statutes and Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face
of Uncertainty, in 1995 ZONING AND PLANNING HANDBOOK 129 (Alan M. Forrest ed. 1995).
[Vol. 20
2
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/5
Stroud / Wright
legislature was to create "a separate and distinct cause of action from the
law of takings' 6 and to provide "for relief, or payment of compensation,
when a new law, rule, regulation, or ordinance ...as applied, unfairly
affects real property."7
There have been numerous articles, seminars, conferences, and
presentations regarding the true meaning and legislative intent of the Act.
There were many participants in its drafting. Legislators themselves rarely
"write" legislation, but rather, they rely on their staff and other experts
(often lobbyists) to reflect their intent. The analogy between sausage
making and law making is not inappropriate.8
The purpose of this article is not to look back at how the Act was
written, but rather to look ahead to the consequences of its implementation.
The authors of this article were close observers of, but not participants in,
the legislative process that brought forth the Act. They cannot claim special
knowledge of the actual intent of those involved in creating the Act.
Moreover, the most fundamental maxim of statutory interpretation is that
one must first read the words of a law as enacted by the legislature to find
their meaning before resorting to explanations of the drafters or other
collateral sources.9 Thus, this article will analyze how the words of the
new legislation might be interpreted and applied to the delicate balance
between private rights and legitimate public purposes.
Although the Act has been described by some of its authors as not
being a radical departure from prior law and "an attempt to provide new and
measured relief for landowners without undermining Florida's landmark
environmental and growth management laws,""° its impact on local
government is likely to be quite severe. The severity of the impact,
however, will not be measured by case law as much as by the unmeasurable,
but real chilling effect the Act will have on governmental regulation of land
6. Ch. 95-181, § 1(1), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
7. Id.
8. This oft quoted, and unflattering, comparison has been attributed to Otto von
Bismarck. Thomas F. Gustafson, former Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives,
described the Act as "the king sausage of all time" at a Florida Institute of Government
Conference on Florida's New Property Rights Law, December 1, 1995.
9. See, e.g., St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1982);
S.R.G. Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1978); Tropical Coach Line,
Inc. v. Carter, 121 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 1960).
10. David L. Powell, et al., Florida's New Law to Protect Private Property Rights, 69
FLA. B.J. 12, 17 (Oct. 1995)
1996]
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use." In addition, the broad scope of the Act, the discretion left to the
courts under vaguely defined concepts, and the prospect of significant
monetary consequences, create a strong incentive for government to
compromise its regulatory authority for case by case settlements with
complaining property owners.
There is little doubt that complaining property owners, through this Act,
have greater potential to achieve monetary and nonmonetary benefits related
to the use of their property not heretofore available. The public-at-large also
will pay for those benefits in many forms, including perhaps less environ-
mental protection, fewer restrictions on land use and in some instances, the
payment of increased taxes to pay for compensation to the private property
owners.
II. CRITICAL ISSUES IN THE ACT
A. Property Rights Protected: The Future is Now
Many of the statutory definitions in this legislation are unique to this
Act. The definitions are a mix of common law principles and new, broadly
described concepts which promise to be the subject of litigation before their
meanings can be more accurately determined.'2 However, a careful reading
and analysis of these critical definitions lead to the conclusion that, contrary
to Florida common law, "existing uses" equal future uses and "vested rights"
equal new rights.
The unique definitions are the key to opening the door to an under-
standing of how the Act will be implemented. Although it is up to the
courts to decide, interpret, and expand upon the Act's meaning,13 attorneys,
planners, elected officials, and landowners will be making decisions without
11. Christopher Wren, City of Fort Lauderdale Planning and Zoning Manager, has
expressed his reluctance in endorsing certain neighborhood association requests to restrict
commercial development. His concern is that the city will be vulnerable to increasing
litigation as a result of landowners' claims for compensation that will result from regulations
that restrict the use of their property. As Mr. Wren has stated: the Act has "handcuffed me
from doing what I consider proper planning." Peter Mitchell, New Property-Rights Law
Sends City Planners Scrambling for Cover, WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1995, at Fl.
12. One commentator describes these definitions as "a grab bag of takings jargon."
Charles Siemon, Remarks at the Meeting of Government Attorneys of Broward County (Oct.
23, 1995).
13. Robert M. Rhodes, Balancing Private Property Rights with Local Government
Regulations, Teleconference Remarks at Florida Institute of Government Conference (Oct.
6, 1995) [hereinafter Teleconference Remarks].
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the luxury of court interpretations of what will surely be fact-based
decisions. As in takings cases, it will be difficult to draw broad generaliza-
tions from these decisions. 4
B. Critical Definitions
1. Existing Use
The Act defines "existing use" as comprising of two types. The first
type is that of "an actual, present use or activity on the real property."15
This includes "periods of inactivity which are normally associated with, or
are incidental to, the nature or type of use or activity."16 The second type
includes land uses which are: 1) reasonably foreseeable; 2) nonspeculative;
3) suitable for the subject real property; 4) compatible with adjacent land
uses; and 5) which have created an existing fair market value in the property
greater than the fair market value of the actual present use or activity. 7
For decades, it has been apparent in Florida that the local government
comprehensive plan would become the dominant force in land development
permitting decisions. The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act
of 19758 mandated the adoption of plans that would be financially
feasible, internally consistent, and implemented by land development
regulations, and ensured that the comprehensive plan would set policy to be
followed by specific development permitting activities.
Because the second type of "existing use" specifically omits "actual,
present use or activity on the real property" and instead focuses on
"foreseeable" or potential future use, the Act raises the possibility that the
comprehensive plan's future land use plan element will define the second
type of existing use. The one purpose of the future land use plan element
is to reflect the nature or type of use or activity that is, in the future,
suitable for the land and compatible with adjacent land uses. It certainly
will be argued that investment decisions can and should be made based upon
14. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987).
The Court held that takings cases are decided by "engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries." Id.
15. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)0b). For a discussion of the drafting history of the term
"existing use," see Thomas G. Pelham, Florida Legislature Enacts Private Property Rights
Protection Act, FLA. PLANNING (Fla. Chapter Am. Planning Ass'n), May-June 1995, at 1.
16. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(b).
17. Il
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a reasonable expectation that the comprehensive plan will be implemented
and that this expectation directly affects the present day valuation of land
through consideration of its future use. 9
Therefore, what may be permitted in the future land use plan element
of an adopted comprehensive plan may be transformed to an existing use in
terms of the Property Rights Act. One consequence of the Act is to
accelerate the applicability of the Future Land Use Plan Element, which
could undermine its effectiveness as a timing tool and thus as a planning
tool.
A participant in the Act's drafting has referred to the definition of
"existing use"2 as the "When Harry Met Sally" or the "I'll have what he's
having" provision, in that it is intended to give a property owner the rights
to the same use of property as that of his neighbor, despite what the plans
or regulations may provide. The impact of this definition goes far beyond
the common law in Florida. For example, Florida common law does not
recognize property rights to existing zoning uses unless those uses have been
determined to be vested under principles of equitable estoppel.2 In so
ruling, the courts have indicated a reluctance to interfere with the local
government power to change zoning to either enlarge or reduce development
potential to meet the needs of the community. 22 Furthermore, the well-
accepted zoning concept of nonconforming uses assumes that government
may change regulations so as to make existing uses unauthorized except to
continue in their existing state, with the expectation that such uses will
gradually be eliminated over time for a more suitable pattern of uses in the
21community. The courts have balanced this principle by holding that
government must have a sufficient reason to justify the zoning change or it
will be found to be either "arbitrary and capricious," or a denial of substan-
tive due process and equal protection under the Constitution.24
19. See William G. Earle, et al., Compensation, in FLORIDA EMINENT DOMAIN PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 175 (4th ed. 1988) (discussing effect of zoning restrictions on analysis of
highest and best use under eminent domain practice).
20. Rhodes, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13.
21. See generally City of Miami Beach v. 8701 Collins Ave., Inc., 77 So. 2d 428 (Fla.
1954).
22. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Dade County, 171 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Sarasota County v. Walker, 144 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
23. See, e.g., 3M Nat'l Advertising Co. v. City of Tampa Code Enforcement Bd., 587
So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Lewis v. City of Atlantic Beach, 467 So. 2d 751,
755 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
24. See Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 1995); Lee
County v. Sunbelt Equities, 619 So. 2d 996, 1006 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
[Vol. 20
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The Act, in contrast, requires compensation for not only actual existing
uses that may be changed, but also for those future uses that are foreseeable,
nonspeculative, suitable and compatible under the Act's unique definition.
Additionally, the weighing of the public good against the burden to the
individual property owners is left to the court, with no statutory presumption
that the government action is valid
Local governments, through their planning and zoning efforts, are
familiar with such terms as "suitability" and "compatibility" and have
developed their own land use definitions for such terms, as incorporated into
comprehensive plans and land development codes.2 6  These existing
definitions may become even more important in assisting a court in
reviewing a claim under the Act. However, the definitions of "reasonably
foreseeable" and "nonspeculative" uses are more problematic. The intent of
the Act's drafters in this regard was apparently to incorporate concepts from
eminent domain valuation law. In eminent domain law, courts have
accepted appraisal testimony regarding highest and best use based in part on
the testifying appraiser's evaluation of whether zoning changes or other land
use changes were reasonably foreseeable." Inclusion of a land use in the
future land use plan element of the adopted comprehensive plan may be
sufficient now to demonstrate that the planned use is reasonably foreseeable
and not speculative. The landowner will argue that zoning and other
development permits for that use, although procedurally necessary, would
be expected to be obtained to remain consistent with the comprehensive plan
and to comply with the Act. Therefore, the planned future use would be
worthy of consideration by the appraiser. The Act may thus effectively
allow uses that under a zoning regulation are either prohibited or permitted
25. The presumption of validity for governmental actions under the state arbitrary and
capricious standard has already been significantly narrowed by the decision of Board of
County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993). The "specific" actions that
form claims under the Act apply the law to specific real property and can be expected to be
considered quasi-judicial actions under Snyder. Id. at 474-75.
26. Pelham, supra note 15.
27. Powell, supra note 10, at 14 n.13.
28. See Broward County v. Patel, 641 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. 1994) (citing 4 JULIUs L.
SACKmAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12C-03(2), 12C-88-90 (rev. 3d ed.
1994)); Board of Comm'rs of State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d 74
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958), cert. quashed, 116 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1959). The testimony as
to "reasonable probability" that rezoning may be changed in the future cannot be based
merely on speculation, but may include an evaluation of the degree of probability that
reasonably exists. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 108 So. 2d at 82-83.
1996] 689
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only under conditional use approval to obtain the status of a compensable
property right, simply by their inclusion in the comprehensive plan.
This change in the law can be expected to create particular
development pressure on the urban fringe of communities where develop-
ment is in transition and undeveloped property is located next to developed
or developing property. 9 Generally, the Act now makes the creation of
zoning districts, or regulatory boundaries and districts, more difficult than
in the past, when the courts gave considerable deference to local government
line-drawing. 0 As early as the first zoning cases, such as Euclid v.
Ambler,31 reasonable classifications which are essential to the creation of
zoning districts were upheld as not violative of the rights of substantive due
process or equal protection. More than ever, attention must be given to the
comprehensive plan to provide a defensible foundation for drawing district
boundaries.
The definition also must give pause to local governments seeking
to provide for higher densities or intensities of development for the future
such as in redevelopment areas. This is because the granting of these future
development rights will have taken on the status of an "existing use," should
the future not unfold as planned or hoped, and the government wishes to
redesign the uses. Finally, because a claim under the Act must be supported
by an appraisal demonstrating that the reasonably foreseeable use has a
greater market value than the present use, there will be a reasonably
foreseeable increase in the market for appraisals and appraisal testimony.
2. Vested Rights
Property rights that are considered "vested" are also expansively
defined under the Act. Vested rights are to be determined not only by
applying the common law principles of equitable estoppel32 and by
29. Pelham, supra note 15.
30. See, e.g., Orange County v. Butler Estates Corp., 328 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding that court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that of
legislative body if issue meets "fairly debatable" standard); Town of Surfside v. Skyline
Terrace Corp., 120 So. 2d 20, 22 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.) (holding that town's ordinance did
not require commercial uses if ordinance can be sustained under "fairly debatable" rule where
adjacent municipality permits commercial operations across street from owner's property),
cert. denied, 123 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1960).
31. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
32. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(a); Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329
So. 2d 10, 15-16 (Fla. 1976). For a general discussion of Florida vested rights law, see
Robert M. Rhodes & Cathy M. Sellers, Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights in Land Use,
[Vol. 20
8
Nova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/5
Stroud / Wright
applying statutory law which explicitly creates vested rights,33 but may also
be determined by applying "substantive due process under the common
law."34 To the extent that a substantive due process right relies on the
proscription against "deprivation of due process" under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution, a "specific action" found to be
constitutionally invalid is now by statutory definition a deprivation of a
"vested right." Thus, a private property owner who has experienced a
substantive due process violation under the state or federal constitutions ap-
pears to also have a claim under the Act and may be awarded compensation
under its provisions.
Some of the participants in the drafting of the law go further to suggest
that the Act "enables the judiciary to craft a constitutionally based vesting
test separate from takings theories or remedies, and distinct from equitable
estoppel. This standard could focus on whether an owner has acquired a
constitutionally protected property interest that should not be diminished or
frustrated by governmental action."3 Although this suggestion seems to
be an invitation for the courts to expand both the common law concepts of
substantive due process and vested rights, it should be noted that the
treatment of substantive due process under the Act can be distinguished
from its treatment of inverse condemnation. In the case of inverse
condemnation or "takings," the Act states specifically that the intent of the
legislature was to create a separate and distinct cause of action from the law
of takings and that a claim under the Act need not rise to the level of a
constitutional taking.36 No such separate or distinct cause of action from
the law of substantive due process is created by the Act.
Nevertheless, the application of substantive due process under the
common law is a dynamic, not a static, concept. Some might argue that
in 2 FLORIDA ENVTL. & LAND USE LAW 8-1 (2d ed. 1994).
33. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8) (providing vesting under Comprehensive Plans);
FLA. STAT. § 373.414(11)-(16) (1995) (providing vesting for Surface Water Management
Permits); FLA. STAT. § 380.05(18) (1995) (providing vesting under Areas of Critical State
Concern); FLA. STAT. § 380.06(20) (1995) (providing vesting under Developments of
Regional Impact). Local government ordinances that implement state statutory vesting
provisions may also grant property rights under the statute. See Powell, supra note 10, at
14.
34. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(a); see generally Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59
F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 1995).
35. Powell, supra note 10, at 14.
36. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(1)(a).
19961
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Florida courts have been inclined not to find such deprivations.37 Certainly
the federal courts have indicated a reluctance to find constitutional violations
based on vested rights. 8 The Act's new provision adds one more dynamic
factor to the mix.
39
The Act's compensable remedy for vested rights expands beyond the
injunctive relief traditionally available to successful litigants. While owners
whose rights have been violated under the state constitutional substantive
due process guarantee are theoretically eligible for compensation as a
remedy, the Florida courts, in practice, look further for a constitutional
taking violation before awarding such compensation.'4 Thus, compensation
becomes a more realistic remedy under the Act for substantive due process
violations.
Local governments have increasingly made use of administrative vested
rights proceedings as a method of resolving vested rights issues short of
trial. Claims asserted under the Act, however, may circumvent these local
vested rights remedies by the Act's provision that administrative remedies
are not required to be exhausted after the 180-day statutory period has
lapsed.4' To the extent that local government may require an applicant to
proceed under a vested rights determination before any specific action is
taken by the government, the administrative vested rights remedy may
continue to be applicable and require exhaustion. However, a local
government vesting determination itself may be the specific action under
which a property owner brings a claim.
37. See, e.g., City of Key West v. R.L.J.S. Corp., 537 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied sub nom. 1800 Atlantic Developers, Inc. v. City of Key West, 545 So.
2d 1367 (Fla. 1989).
38. See, e.g., Restigouche, 59 F.3d at 1208; Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d
1369, 1374 (1lth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1400 (1994). Contra A.A. Profiles v.
City of Ft. Lauderdale, 850 F.2d 1483 (11 th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989).
The federal court's state of flux on this matter is illustrated by the vacation of the case of
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536 (11 th Cir.), vacated, 42
F.3d 626 (lth Cir. 1994).
39. To what extent does the inclusion of the right to substantive due process also include
the right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment? Unless a
fundamental right or suspect classification is involved, generally the courts will review equal
protection claims under the same standards as substantive due process claims. See Executive
100, Inc. v. Martin County, 922 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991).
However, for that more narrow class of persons protected by equal protection guarantees, the
Act apparently provides no additional protection.
40. See, e.g., Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 640
So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
41. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a).
[Vol. 20
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The definition of "inordinate burden" requires the court, without
statutory standards or guidance, to make the equitable decision on the proper
balance of public and private interests. As explained by some of the Act's
drafters, the legislature expected and intended that the court would be left
to interpret the meaning of such terms.42 The extent to which the Act
leaves this matter to court interpretation has been suggested to be a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine.a3
There are two classifications of "inordinate burdens" defined in the Act.
The first is an action which: 1) directly restricts or limits the use of real
property; 2) such that the owner is permanently restricted; 3) from attaining
the reasonable investment-backed expectation for; and 4) his existing use or
vested right to a specific use of the property as a whole. The second
inordinate burden occurs if the owner is left with unreasonable uses such
that he bears permanently a disproportionate share of the burden imposed
for the good of the public, "which, in all fairness and justice should be
borne by the public as a whole."'
The definition of "inordinate burden" invites the court to review the
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations for the use of
the property. This investigation into investment-backed expectations is a
well-recognized, but ill-defined, part of the takings law equation.45 Under
takings law, courts have looked to the regulation at the time of the land
purchase, the owner's ability to obtain financing, and other such criteria.
However, the Act specifically indicates that its claims need not be construed
under the takings law.
46
42. Robert M. Rhodes & Dean Saunders, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13.
43. Hamilton Rice, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13. See, e.g., City of
Aubumdale v. Adams Packing Ass'n, 171 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1965). See generally B.H. v.
State, 645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2559 (1995) (discussing strict
separation of powers rule in Florida Constitution).
44. This language comes directly from Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960), and is cited in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994). See also
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.4 (1987).
45. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Reahard v. Lee
County, 968 F.2d 1131, 1136 (lth Cir. 1992) (setting forth factors to be analyzed in
resolving federal "takings" disputes), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1693 (1995); Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1382 (Fla.), cert. denied sub nom. Taylor v. Graham, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981) (discussing "reasonableness" factor of taking regulation).
46. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(9).
This section provides a cause of action for governmental actions that may
not rise to the level of a taking under the State Constitution or the United States
1996]
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Under the Act, it is intended that the threshold level of an owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectation for the Act's purposes may be
lower than that required to find a taking. There is no nexus required by the
Act between the time of land purchase, or the specific action creating the
burden, and the time of fulfillment of the expectation. Economic expecta-
tions continually evolve and their reasonableness cannot be easily judged at
a fixed point in time. In the case of takings, this difficulty is mitigated
somewhat by the requirement that the result of government action is that no
substantial use of the property can be made,n7 thereby applying to the
extraordinary case. However, the Act does not establish any specific
threshold of property value loss, so that theoretically, an inordinate burden
can apply to any property value loss. Thus, under the Act, the question of
economic expectations will arise more frequently and its importance has
become more significant.
An important aspect of the inordinate burden definition is that the
property owner must be "permanently" unable to attain the reasonable
investment-backed expectation for the use of the property.48 However,
what constitutes a "permanent" restriction is very problematic. For example,
a property which is classified for more liberal uses under the future land use
element of the comprehensive plan than what is permitted by existing zoning
regulations may not be "permanently" restricted because the future land use
plan projects a more liberal classification for the future. The Supreme Court
of Florida has recognized that comprehensive planning under the state's
growth management laws reasonably incorporates such a timing aspect.49
Indeed, comprehensive plans are required to be periodically updated and
land use regulations must be updated to be consistent with the plans under
Constitution. This section may not necessarily be construed under the case law
regarding takings if the governmental action does not rise to the level of a
taking.
Id.
47. Graham, 399 So. 2d at 1383 (citing Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation
Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965); Askew v. Gables-By-The-Sea, Inc., 333 So. 2d
56 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 345 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1977)).
48. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(e).
49. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 475 (Fla. 1993). "A
comprehensive plan only establishes a long-range maximum limit on the possible intensity
of land use. . . . The present use of land may, by zoning ordinance, continue to be more
limited than the future use contemplated by the comprehensive plan." Id. (citing City of
Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984), rev.
denied, 469 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1985)).
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the state's growth management laws.50  As a result of the permanent
restriction criterion, "rate of growth" .regulations, focusing on the timing of
development, may become the development management tool of choice for
local governments.5 ' For similar reasons, concurrency programs which
should not be adversely affected by the Act if they are properly incorporated
in the comprehensive plan, include achievable and maintainable level of
service standards based on a financially feasible capital improvements
element, and are implemented in accordance with adopted land development
regulations.
4. Specific Action
The trigger for a claim under the Act is when a governmental agency
takes "specific action" which affects real property. The governmental
agency may be a state, regional, or local government (including special
districts).5 2 A specific action includes an action on an application or per-
mit."3 The Act does not create a cause of action as to the mere adoption
of a law, regulation, rule, or ordinance but only as to specific action that is
applied to real property.
The Private Property Rights Act provides that it is to have a prospec-
tive effect; that is, no cause of action exists under the statute as to the
application of a law, rule, regulation or ordinance adopted prior to May 11,
1995 or noticed for adoption or enactment prior to that date. If these grand-
fathered laws, regulations, rules and ordinances are amended, the Act applies
only to the extent that the application of the amendatory language imposes
an inordinate burden apart from the grandfathered law.' However, it can
be expected that the courts will be asked to apply the Act to governmental
actions on permit applications that take place after that date. Property
50. See FLA. STAT. § 163.3191(1)-(4).
51. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER & ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF LAND DEvELOPMENT 565 (2d ed. 1984); Barbara Childs, Constitutionality of
Phased Growth Zoning Ordinances, 8 URB. LAW. 512 (1976); Note, Phased Zoning:
Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1976).
52. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(3)(c). The definition specifically excludes actions of the
United States or any of its agencies or any state, regional, or local agency exercising its
powers through a formal delegation of federal authority.
53. Id. § 70.001(3)(d). Section 70.001(3)(e) excludes from the definition of "inordinate
burden" temporary impacts; the abatement, prohibition, prevention or remediation of a public
nuisance or noxious use; or governmental actions taken to grant relief to a property owner
under the Act. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
54. Id. § 70.001(12).
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owners will argue that an inordinate burden created by the improper or
unauthorized application of a prior-enacted or noticed law, regulation, rule,
or ordinance should trigger a claim under the Act, lest government attempt
to explain all such subsequent actions as simply implementation of prior
law.
For example, a permit application may be denied or delayed at times
or conditions and exactions may be imposed for which there is no clear
authority or legal justification. Applicants suspect that a government entity
has little to lose by stretching the envelope of demands, when at worst the
unauthorized denial, delay, exaction or condition would be invalidated by
the courts. However, under the Act, if this activity is found to be a specific
action creating an inordinate burden under the Act, an injured property
owner has a cause of action for compensatory damages.
5. Real Property
The Act's definition of "real property" focuses exclusively on
property's physical attributes, including land, its appurtenances and
improvements thereto, and other relevant real property in which the property
owner has a relevant interest." This simplified and narrow focus on the
tangible interests in real property, to the exclusion of the intangible interests,
ignores the remainder of the "bundle of rights" which constitutes proper-
ty.56 It is thus unclear to what extent the Act would protect such intangible
interests as the "right to exclude" the public from use of private property.
In recent United States Supreme Court taking cases, this right has been the
bedrock upon which the Court has based its decisions to find a taking for
public use without compensation.57
III. ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PROCESSES UNDER THE ACT
A. Claims
The Act establishes a 180-day process for resolution of a claim prior
to the time that the owner may bring that claim to a circuit court. Within
a year of the government action complained of, the landowner must file a
written claim with each governmental agency which was either involved in
55. Id § 70.001(3)(g).
56. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
57. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316 (1994) (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444
U.S. at 176); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
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the action or whose participation is necessary for a complete resolution of
all the relevant issues." The claim must be accompanied by an appraisal.
Within fifteen days, the governmental entity must report the claim and
information regarding a government contact person to the Florida Depart-
ment of Legal Affairs. The governmental entity must also provide written
notice of the claim to adjacent property owners and to "all parties to any
administrative action that gave rise to the claim," although no specific time
frame is required for such notice.
59
B. Settlement Offers
During this statutory 180-day period,6° the governmental entity must
make a written settlement offer to the owner. The settlement offer may
provide for adjustment of the regulations that apply to the use, for mitigation
of the regulatory effect, such as transfers of development rights, or for
attachment of conditions to the use. The settlement offer may require that
the use be addressed on a more comprehensive basis. It may also provide
for "no changes to the action of the governmental entity. 6 l
The settlement offer will be considered by the court in determining if
the government has inordinately burdened the real property.62 A jury must
be impaneled to determine compensation in the event of a valid claim. The
jury must also consider the settlement offer. For this reason, a generous
offer can be an opportunity for the government to reduce potential damages
in the event of liability. 63 Finally, the settlement offer will be considered
by the court in any award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party, as
58. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a). The section states:
If the action of government is the culmination of a process that involves more
than one governmental entity, or if a complete resolution of all relevant issues,
in the view of the property owner or in the view of a governmental entity to
whom a claim is presented, requires the active participation of more than one
governmental entity, the property owner shall present the claim as provided in
this section to each of the governmental entities.
Id.
59. Id § 70.001(4)(b). Presumably, at the same time, the governmental entity will also
provide notice to those other governmental entities which, in its view, must actively
participate for a complete resolution of all relevant issues. See id. § 70.001(4)(a).
60. The period may be extended by the parties. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(c).
61. Id. § 70.001(4)(c)ll.
62. I. § 70.001(6)(a).
63. Id. § 70.001(6)(b).
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mitigated by the knowledge available to the governmental entity and the
property owner during the 180-day notice period.'
It is reasonable to expect a prudent government, therefore, to make a
settlement offer, backed up by its appraiser's valuation of the property. It
can be further expected that the settlement offer will extend compensation
beyond what the government believes its liability might actually be to
reduce the risk in the event liability is found. The owner's risk in not
accepting such a settlement offer is that it will not prevail and the court will
award higher attorney's fees to the government, based on the owner's
unreasonableness in not accepting an offer.65 In either event, the parties
are encouraged to settle, rather than proceed to court, by incentives not
applicable in common law actions. This is precisely why there may not be
a wealth of case law resulting from claims filed under the Act and why
there is likely to be a considerable number of claims filed and resolved in
settlement.66
The Act builds in extraordinary flexibility for the governmental entity
to effectuate a settlement. In addition to issuing a variance, special
exception, or other extraordinary relief, the governmental entity in the
settlement of a claim under the Act may agree to actions which otherwise
would have the effect of contravening applicable statutes.67 However, in
this instance the parties must obtain court approval under a standard which
requires the court to find that such relief "protects the public interest served
by the statute at issue and is the appropriate relief necessary to prevent the
governmental regulatory effort from inordinately burdening the real
property. '6' By permitting a court to effectuate a settlement agreement that
overrides state law, the Act may be permitting an unlawful delegation of
legislative authority to the courts.
This provision may also engender unnecessary litigation to create court
jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The Act provides that "the
governmental entity and the property owner shall jointly file an action...
for approval of the settlement agreement by the court ... "69 Parties with
64. Id. § 70.001(6)(c)1.-2.
65. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(c)2.
66. See Robert C. Downie II, Property Rights: Will Exceptions Become the Rule?, 69
FLA. B.J. 69 (Nov. 1995).
67. The contravention of local ordinance, however, may not be allowed, as the Act only
specifically allows "contravening the application of a statute as it would otherwise apply to
the subject real property .... " FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(d)2. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. § 70.001(4)(d)2.
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conflicting interests may contest the validity of an agreement under existing
law. Will parties who have entered into an agreement which purports to
have resolved their conflicts, have the necessary controversy or standing to
file such an action without an opposing party?70 To avoid a collusive or
"friendly" lawsuit, the parties could only enter into a settlement agreement
contravening a statute after waiting out the 180-day notice period, while at
the same time remaining in an adversarial posture. The parties could then
institute a lawsuit under the Act and bring it to issue so that the court could
have jurisdiction to consider the jointly filed action for approval of the
settlement agreement.
C. Ripeness Decisions
If the property owner rejects the settlement offer, then the governmental
entities with whom a claim has been filed must issue a "ripeness decision"
which identifies allowable uses to which the subject property may be put.
Once the ripeness decision has been issued, and at the expiration of the 180
days, the owner need not exhaust administrative remedies but may file the
claim in circuit court.7 ' Commentators have heralded this provision as
among its most significant,72 arguing that remedies under takings law have
proven inadequate in large part because of the stringency of court require-
ments that an action be ripe for adjudication.73 The ripeness decision, like
the settlement offer, will be considered by the court in determining whether
the government has inordinately burdened real property, and in determining
attorney's fees that may be awarded to the prevailing party. Likewise, the
jury may consider the ripeness decision in awarding compensation for a
successful claim.74
D. Court Proceedings
The owner must file the claim in the circuit court in the county where
the real property is located. The claim must be filed on each of the
governmental entities that made a settlement offer and a ripeness decision
70. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
71. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(5)(a)-(b). The parties may agree to an extension of time.
72. Richard Grosso, Analysis of CS/HB 863 (1995): Florida's New Property Rights
Legislation, Remarks at the Annual Environmental Land Use Law Update (Aug. 17-19,
1995).
73. Wade L. Hopping, Address at the Annual Environmental and Land Use Law Update
(Aug. 18, 1995).
74. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b).
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which were rejected by the owner." It is the court's responsibility to
determine if a property right exists, as defined under the statute, and whether
the government has inordinately burdened the property, apportioning the
responsibility as necessary between each governmental entity involved.76
An opportunity is provided for an interlocutory appeal of the court's finding
that there is an inordinate burden, but a government which does not prevail
in the interlocutory appeal is subject to costs and the reasonable attorney's
fees incurred by the property owner.77
If an inordinate burden has been found, the court must impanel a jury
to determine the compensation due to the owner. Compensation is
determined by calculating the difference in fair market value of the property
that is due to the inordinate burden placed on the property at the time of the
governmental action at issue. The jury must also consider the government's
settlement offer and ripeness decision in determining the loss in market
value.7"
The Act provides that "[t]his section does not affect the sovereign
immunity of government."79 It has been argued that, as a later enacted
statute, the Act supersedes sovereign immunity limitations.8" However, the
plain meaning of this sentence would appear to be that whatever sovereign
immunity is available to government is not changed by the Act. Sovereign
immunity for damages in tort is limited by the Florida Statutes."1 Statutes
are to be construed in pari materi, and the Act does not specifically conflict
with the sovereign immunity statute." Furthermore, the compensatory
relief available from the Act arguably is for a new form of statutory
"tort," 83 and thus only limited compensation is available under the Act.
75. Id. § 70.001(5)(b).
76. Id. § 70.001(6)(a).
77. Id.
78. d § 70.001(6)(b).
79. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(13)
80. Rhodes, Teleconference Remarks, supra note 13. See State v. Dunmann, 427 So.
2d 166, 168 (Fla. 1983) (holding that last expression of legislature will prevail in case of
conflict).
81. See FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1995).
82. Singleton v. State, 554 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1990). For further discussion on state
sovereign immunity in tort actions, see District Sch. Bd. v. Talmadge, 381 So. 2d 698 (Fla.
1980).
83. Constitutional takings have been described as "constitutional torts" for many years,
with the courts applying statutes of limitations applicable to tort actions as a result. See, e.g.,
Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). This analogy
would also be applicable to the Act, as it so apparently mimics takings law and specifically
includes constitutional due process violations in its coverage.
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E. Further Impacts to Government and Landowners
The processes under the Act are cumbersome for both the government
and the property owner, but most particularly for the government. The Act
anticipates that multiple parties will be involved to resolve disputes under
the Act. Not only must each government agency involved in a challenged
action participate in the Act's processes, but if either the property owner or
one of the named governmental entities believes another governmental agen-
cy's participation is necessary for "complete resolution of all relevant
issues," 4 then those other governmental entities may be brought into the
process. Given the complex nature of development permits, one might
expect that the majority of property rights claims would involve the
Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Community
Affairs, a regional water management district, a local government, and
perhaps several special districts. Adjacent property owners must also be
notified, as well as all parties to an administrative action that gives rise to
the claim. "Parties" to administrative actions may include not only
governmental agencies, but also citizen interest groups, banks or mortgage
companies, development companies, and generally all persons who are
defined as parties under the state Administrative Procedure Act. 5 Al-
though the Act does not provide these administrative parties the full status
of a party under its provisions, the Act's participants will necessarily
consider their interests as well.
Assuming that the process for arriving at a settlement offer is
confidential and privileged, 6 the process for achieving a meaningful
settlement offer places a significant burden on the local government. Unlike
the typical situation where litigation is in process, the government may be
acting without full knowledge of the relevant facts regarding the property
and the property owner's expectations for his land. Because a suit will not
84. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(a).
85. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(12)(a)-(d) (1995).
86. The Public Records Act exempts disclosure of work product prepared in anticipation
of imminent litigation or proceedings until the conclusion of the litigation or proceedings.
See FLA. STAT. § 119.07 (1995). It is reasonable to assume that once a landowner files a
written claim with the government agency under § 1(4)(a) of the Act, imminent litigation or
proceedings can legitimately be anticipated. However, the records must have been prepared
by the government attorney, or at his express direction, and must reflect a "mental
impression, conclusion, litigation strategy or legal theory of the attorney or the agency." Id.
§ 119.07(1); see also City of Orlando v. Desjardins, 493 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. 1986);
Smith & Williams, P.A. v. West Coast Regional Water Supply Auth., 640 So. 2d. 216, 217
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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have yet been filed in circuit court, it is doubtful that discovery under the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure will be available to assist the government
in determining the pertinent facts. At a minimum, the government is well
advised to immediately hire an appraiser to review the appraisal submitted
with the written claim. It must investigate the history of the property's use
and to the extent it is possible, the expenditures made by a property owner
so as to determine any reliance expenditures for vested rights purposes, and
to determine which expectations were "investment-backed."
Unlike settlements made during the course of litigation, the Act does
not provide for counter offers and continuing negotiations for settlement.
Thus, if the parties continue to negotiate, it is unclear if further settlement
offers will be considered either by the court or the jury during court
proceedings.
In addition to making a settlement offer, the government entity or
entities must issue a ripeness decision which identifies allowable uses to
which the subject property may be put. The advantage of a ripeness
decision to the property owner appears to be more procedural than
substantive. The ripeness decision ostensibly allows the property owner to
know how his property may be used under the governmental regulations, but
in reality it is more likely to act simply as the property owner's ticket to the
courthouse. Governmental regulation, as a practical matter, more often
describes what a property owner cannot do rather than what he can do.
Obviously, this is of great frustration to the property owner. However, it
reflects the reality that government regulation is to prevent public harm, and
not to be responsible to specify the details of development of private
property, which is an entrepreneurial activity involving more complex
decisions than merely regulatory ones. Moreover, in making allowances for
specific proposals that may be permitted under the proper circumstances, the
government may provide for a great range of conditional uses. Rather than
describing developments which may be appropriate under specific condi-
tions, which would require tpie government agency to plan in some detail for
the property, it is likely that the government may only realistically be able
to repeat back to the property owner the regulation itself.
In the face of numerous parties with differing legal responsibilities and
authorities, the ability to arrive at a settlement offer or ripeness decision
within 180 days will be a considerable task for each of the governmental
entities involved. Arriving at an agreed upon settlement offer or ripeness
decision involving numerous parties will challenge even the most astute,
best intentioned, and best managed governmental entities.
At the same time, the 180-day time period presents its own difficulties
to the landowners. From the landowner's perspective, the time frames in the
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Act are not realistic or conducive to resolving the situation without
litigation. A delay of 180 days to initiate litigation and then more delay to
bring it to a conclusion can be the death knell of any development project.
Such a delay may result in a proposed development missing the market,
losing financing, and losing the value of the money invested in the land or
project. In addition, these costs as reflected in an appraisal, if ultimately
considered by the jury in an award, may involve compensation that could
cripple many governmental budgets. 7 The potential gain could encourage
marginally successful development projects to be shelved by some land
owners, in the hope of achieving a compensatory payoff higher than market
risks might justify by proceeding with the project.
The new cause of action and remedy created by the Act is not
exclusive. The property owner will be able to bring a collateral action on
a claim under the Act, for example, to invalidate an exaction condition to
a permit. If a specific action is found to be a violation of substantive due
process and creates an inordinate burden under the Act, even though not at
the level of a Nollan or Dolan taking, then the property owner would
nonetheless be eligible to bring an action for both compensation and
invalidation of the improper condition, with the ability to elect the most
favorable remedy.
At present, the incentive has been for a developer to move forward with
the project, even if questionable conditions or exactions were required as a
condition of approval. Often the marginal project either did not advance to
completion, or if it did, it survived at the edge of profitability. Now a new
business decision will come into play: whether to continue the quest for the
necessary development permits and proceed with the project, or put it in
mothballs, play the compensation game, and seek compensation with a
property appraisal based on rose colored sales projections without incurring
the risk of up front development or marketing costs.
The administrative and judicial processes set out in the Act will
severely disadvantage third parties. Although the government must give
notice to "contiguous" property owners when a claim is filed," these
87. Current value based on potential profit from a venture is a legitimate method of
appraisal. The appraisal will be of more than the mere dirt (land), but also includes the value
of the right to use the land and the potential to make a profit from its development, which
increases its present value. For a detailed discussion on evaluating the proper interests of
parties along with the proper determination of fair market value in condemnation
proceedings, see Board of Comm'rs of State Insts. v. Tallahassee Bank & Trust Co., 100 So.
2d 67, 69-70 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (per curiam).
88. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(4)(b).
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owners or other affected parties who are not government entities have no
formal role in the process. Indeed, property owners whose properties may
be negatively affected by a settlement under the Act are specifically
prohibited from bringing their own claims under the Act. The Act precludes
claims based on "impacts to real property caused by an action of a govern-
mental entity taken to grant relief to a property owner under this section." 9
Presumably, settlement offers made under the Act must be approved by
local governments at public meetings. However, the extent to which
affected parties will be able to influence decisions made at that late date is
questionable. For other governmental agencies' actions which are not
formalized at public meetings, such as certain state governmental actions,
affected parties do not have a point of entry under the Act.
The consequences of a successful claim under the Act based on an
unlawful denial, condition, or delay, jeopardizing the success of a viable
development project, may go far beyond what has been contemplated. The
following example illustrates such consequences. With a residential real
estate project, between 20%-30% of the total sales value can be attributed
to the land. If 25% of the total sales price of a dwelling unit were to be
attributed to land, a 100-acre five dwelling unit per acre project with a
$200,000 per dwelling unit sales price would yield $100,000,000 with $25
million attributable to land or $50,000 per dwelling unit. If the land owner
paid $100,000 an acre for land, but could recoup $250,000 an acre at sale
after incurring the costs of land development necessary to allow for the
construction of dwelling units, then the theoretical increase in the value of
the land at sale would be $15,000,000.
A property owner could make a compensation demand for the
difference between value as inordinately burdened and the value of the land
as enhanced by its theoretical land value at retail sale, the reasonable
investment-backed expectation. A jury will determine the total amount of
compensation for the loss in value due to the inordinate burden and will by
necessity rely heavily on appraisal testimony to set an award within a broad
range of values. The property appraiser could use the "development
approach," a long accepted method of valuation of vacant acreage which, by
definition, is not speculative. Instead, it is a method which demonstrates
how present value has been enhanced by what could have been achieved but
for the governmental action creating the alleged inordinate burden.9"
89. Id. § 70.001(3)(e).
90. See, e.g., Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So. 2d. 219 (Fla. 1955); Boynton v. Canal
Auth., 265 So. 2d. 722 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1972); see also Earle, supra note 19, § 9.32
at 223. The development method of valuation would avoid the "business damage" exception
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If compensation is awarded to a property owner under the Act, the
government entity which pays compensation then obtains the title and rights
of use in the property interest. The court will determine the form of the
right which is to be transferred and the recipient of that right.91 The
consequences of this provision are very uncertain. For example, will the
rights to build to a certain height limit be able to be effectively used by a
governmental agency? In accruing a number of partial interests in land, will
the government become entangled in various real property and title disputes
as time marches on? Title insurers and county record clerks are sure to
have their duties complicated by such disparate interests.
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT WILL THE PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS
ACT MEAN FOR FLORIDA'S FUTURE?
Doctors are taught that in their medical practice they must "first do no
harm." The legislative process involves more experimentation and risk
taking than would be condoned if practiced by a physician, and it is not
uncommon for the legislative cure to be worse than the disease, or for a
faulty diagnosis to result in a legislative cure for the wrong disease.
Will a new cause of action and remedy, creating new legal rights and
legal procedures which force judicial activism, move Florida forward to a
better system of government planning and land development regulation that
protects both the public interest and private property owners' constitutional
rights? The following will consider what could happen.
Landowners with viable development projects that are -funded and
designed to meet near term market conditions will gain no direct benefit
from a new opportunity under the Act to go to court and collect compensa-
tion, which at best would be a break-even proposition. However, a
landowner who is ready to proceed with a development project that meets
the market, is consistent with the applicable comprehensive plan, and is able
to meet applicable land development regulations, could gain a greater degree
of certainty if the Act causes local governments and agencies to more
closely adhere to their adopted plans and regulations.
Government agencies will be, and should be, wary of straying from
their adopted plans and regulations, especially when tempted to deviate for
political or other reasons not related to the plans and regulations. As local
governments go through the statutorily mandated evaluation and review
process, increased attention will be paid to the potential for the plan to
in the Act. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(6)(b).
91. FLA. STAT. § 70.001(7)(b).
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create present rights, not simply future rights. The plan will thus take on
increased importance as a regulatory tool, not simply a planning tool.
There is a danger that government entities will "freeze at the stick" and
avoid making decisions out of fear of violating the Act. Certainly,
government agencies have more incentive now to avoid making tough land
use decisions that might attract litigation under the Act. Unjustified delay,
however, may subject a local government to a mandamus action to force a
decision. If an unlawful delay is construed to be a specific action, then the
governmental agency may also run the risk of being required to pay
compensation to cover the loss of property values caused by the delayed
developer that has missed a market opportunity. However, if the Act causes
a greater recognition of the risk of deviating from adopted law, then it may
have the beneficial effect of causing greater respect for the rule of law by
both landowners and government.
As a result of the Act, litigation over the nature of regulation and
property rights will now be more, rather than less, complex. Property
owners now already faced with a menu of causes of action, including
federal, state and administrative claims, petitions for writs of mandamus,
certiorari review, de novo actions, and claims involving jury issues and non-
jury issues, will find litigation management to be more challenging than
ever. For reasons explained above, settlement negotiations will be more
complicated, more legally oriented, more adversarial, and less productive.
It is common in the Florida Legislature for landmark legislation to be
followed by a "glitch bill" to revise it, often before there has been sufficient
time and experience invested in finding meaning and practical application
of the original legislation. The legislature will be in session at the time of
publication of this article. Attempts to tinker at the edges of this Act before
it is understood and implemented could cause more harm than good. The
authors believe that any action on the Act should be limited to its repeal.
Otherwise, the outcome will consist of further confusion and uncertainty.
Both government and landowners must struggle to reconcile their
planning needs and the need to balance property rights with public
protection. It may be many years before the full effect of the Act can be
truly ascertained. The authors hope that reasonable people may meet on
common ground and work together to develop a fair and effective system
of planning and regulation that will make the Act's provisions moot.
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